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I. INTRODUCTION
In employment law cases where a plaintiff pursues damages for
emotional distress, defendants often seek unrestricted access to
plaintiff's medical records on the basis that the records may
potentially contain evidence regarding alternative stressors
contributing to the plaintiffs emotional distress. The general point
that any physical malady might cause emotional distress may be
true, "but it scarcely gives defendants a license to rummage
through all aspects of the plaintiff's life in search of a possible
source of stress or distress, particularly with respect to information
that the governing law treats as especially sensitive."' Even in
situations where there is no applicable psychotherapist-patient or
physician-patient privilege, or there has been a waiver of the
privilege (s), the defendant is not entitled to carte blanche access to
a lifetime of plaintiffs medical records. "Because of the recognized
sensitivity of medical records, a party seeking their disclosure must
make a strong and clear showing of such relevance, and mere
generalizations that medical records of unspecified matters might
relate in some unspecified way to a claim of emotional distress is
obviously inadequate."'
There is no uniformity on how federal courts analyze the
discovery of plaintiffs' medical records in employment law cases
involving emotional distress.' When it comes to these cases, courts
frequently struggle with what Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
applies to their production, the scope of the production, and
privilege and waiver issues. Courts often "conflate privilege/waiver
with relevancy, medical records with medical examinations, and
generic medical records with mental-health-related medical
records."4 This article urges a thorough, tailored, and legally sound
approach to determining issues relating to the production of
1. Evanko v. Elec. Sys. Assocs., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 2851, 1993 WL 14458, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993).
2. Id.
3. Although this Article references states' laws generally, the primary focus
is on how federal courts handle this issue.
4. John Doe I v. Mulcahy, Inc., No. 08-306, 2008 WL 4572515, at *4 (D.
Minn. Oct. 14, 2008); see also Carr v. Double T Diner, No. WMN-10-CV-00230, 2010
WL 3522428, at *3 n.4 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2010) (suggesting that the plaintiff did not
appreciate the different analytical frameworks governing privilege waiver, Rule 35
independent mental examinations, and discovery of medical records).
2
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medical records in employment cases involving emotional distress
damages. 5
This article will first provide an overview of emotional distress
damages in employment law cases.6 Then it will discuss the
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence to the production of medical records for claims
involving emotional distress damages.7 Thereafter, the article will
summarize the vastly different results that courts have reached on
the issues of temporal and substantive scope of medical records .
Next, the article will explore the psychotherapist-patient and
physician-patient privileges. 9 After that, the article will discuss
privacy concerns relating to the production of medical records.'0
Finally, the article will suggest an approach for parties, and an
analytical framework for courts, to efficiently and effectively resolve
disputes relating to medical records in employment law cases
involving claims of emotional distress."
II. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
Plaintiffs may recover emotional distress damages for a variety
of claims that typically arise in the employment context. Emotional
distress damages are recoverable under various statutes, including
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as
under certain other federal and state statutes providing protection
for employees.12 They are also available in connection with tort
causes of action such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
fraud, defamation, or wrongful discharge cases based on a tort
theory. 3
5. This Article does not specifically address the discoverability of medical
records in cases involving disability claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-797, or state law. Nor is it intended to specifically relate to cases
involving physical injuries suffered by plaintiffs.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See infra Part VII.
12. See generally 1 PAUL H. TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS
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To recover damages for emotional distress, a plaintiff does not
have to demonstrate that her mental distress is severe or
accompanied by a physical injury, nor must she have proof of
medical treatment."4 A plaintiffs own testimony is a sufficient basis
for emotional distress or mental anguish, and such an award need
not be supported by expert testimony.15 However, an award of
emotional distress damages must still be supported by "competent
evidence of 'genuine injury. ' '" 6 As noted in the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission (EEOC) Policy Guide:
Emotional harm will not be presumed simply because the
complaining party is a victim of discrimination. The
existence, nature, and severity of emotional harm must be
proved. Emotional harm may manifest itself, for example,
as sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain,
humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self esteem,
excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Physical
manifestations of emotional harm may consist of ulcers,
gastrointestinal disorders, hair loss, or headaches. 7
As with other categories of damages, a plaintiff must show that
the emotional distress was proximately caused by the defendant's
illegal conduct.' 8 Moreover, a plaintiff seeking emotional distress
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th
Cir. 1981) (" [S] pecific proof of out-of-pocket losses or medical testimony... is not
necessary." (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974))); Gillson
v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 492 N.W.2d 835, 842 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
("Recoverable pain and suffering does not have to 'be severe or accompanied by
physical injury.'" (quoting Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670,
677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991))).
15. See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Medical
or other expert evidence is not required to prove emotional distress." (citing Turic
v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996))); Moody v. Pepsi-
Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 210 (6th Cir. 1990); Williams, 660 F.2d at
1273 (citing Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 236 (8th Cir. 1976));
Gillson, 492 N.W.2d at 842 ("A trial court can award damages based on subjective
testimony." (citing Bradley, 471 N.W.2d at 677)).
16. Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527, 531 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n.20 (1978)); Turic, 85 F.3d at 1215 (quoting
Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.20); Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 739
F.2d 1102, 1108 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64 & n.20).
17. EEOC Decision No. 915.002, 1992 WL 189089, at *5 (July 14, 1992)
(citation omitted).
18. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "It was plaintiff's burden to prove that the
harassment proximately caused the ultimate condition," and the "law recognizes
4
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has to prove that the defendant's unlawful conduct was a• 19
substantial cause of her psychological or emotional distress. The
plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant's conduct was
20the sole cause of her emotional distress damages. Moreover, it is
well established that a defendant may be held liable for aggravating
a plaintiffs preexisting condition.2 ' Accordingly, expert testimony
(where offered) may not be excluded simply because the plaintiff
had multiple psychological stressors that could have contributed to• . 22
her emotional distress, except in extreme cases where the expert's
disregard of alternative causes is so extreme as to justify exclusion
of his testimony as unreliable."
In turn, the defendant is entitled to demonstrate that it should
not be held liable for the entire amount of plaintiffs emotional
distress damages because of the plaintiffs preexisting mental
no 'could have been a factor' standard of causation." Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791
F.2d 439, 444 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Harvey v. Blake,
913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562,
568-69 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 444 & n.3).
19. Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D. 617, 620 (D. Utah 1995); see also
Rettiger v. IBP, Inc., No. 96-4015-SAC, 1999 WL 318153, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 6,
1999) (citing Bottomly, 163 F.R.D. at 620).
20. Bottomly, 163 F.R.D. at 620.
21. Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1025-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see, e.g.,
Alston v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., No. 83 C 2780, 1985 WL 2469,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 1985) (noting that, although plaintiff previously had some
physical problems, "defendant must take plaintiff as it finds her, and plainly her
physical condition was adversely affected by the discriminatory actions taken by
defendant against her").
22. See Bell v. Gonzales, No. Civ. A. 03-163, 2005 WL 3555490, at *17 (D.D.C.
Dec. 23, 2005) ("[R]eversing lower court exclusion of expert testimony addressing
emotional injuries where lower court justified exclusion based on experts' failure
to distinguish between causal effect of 'multiple psychological stresses."' (citing
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297-99 (8th Cir. 1997))); Webb v.
Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 1094, 1114 (D.D.C. 1994) (admitting expert testimony on
psychological injury, even though other factors in plaintiff's life could have
contributed to her psychological injuries, because testimony would assist the trier
of fact in assessing the injury issue and a "substantial" cause standard had no basis
in law).
23. Bell, 2005 WL 3555490, at *17 ("[E]xcluding expert testimony where
witness 'utterly failed to investigate or even inquire as to how [other] factors may
have contributed to his depression,' including divorce, other failed relationships,
murder of parents, and familial history of chemical imbalance." (alteration in
original) (quoting Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., Nos. 98 CV-4572 (ERK), 00-
CV-0134 (ERK), 2003 WL 21799913, at *19 (E.D.N.YJan. 22, 2003))).
[Vol. 41:3
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health issues or other sources of emotional distress. 2' A defendant
can undermine a plaintiffs claim of emotional distress if it can
demonstrate that "the onset of symptoms of emotional harm
preceded the [alleged] discrimination. A plaintiff's vulnerability
or unusual sensitivity is relevant in determining damages.26 The
24. Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (reducing
jury's monetary award for emotional harm caused by racial discrimination because
"there were many other unpleasant factors in her life which almost certainly
contributed to her emotional distress" (citing Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863
F.2d 1503, 1516 (11th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993))); see also Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 444-45 &
n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing compensatory damages when plaintiff endured
emotional injury from his work environment but reversing award attributed to
plaintiff's physical decline because "insufficient certainty as to causation exists" as
his health had been failing due to his smoking, diet, and family history of
hypertension), abrogated on other grounds by Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.
1990); EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
("[E] motional distress [which plaintiff] allegedly suffered as a result of the sexual
harassment could have been effected by her depression and vice versa. Defendant
should be able to determine whether Plaintiffs emotional state may have been
effected by something other than Defendant's alleged actions."); Hawkins v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-688, 2006 WL 2422596, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
22, 2006) ("Because a defendant is typically liable in damages only for any
exacerbation of a pre-existing condition, be it physical or psychological, it is
important for the defendant to learn about and explore the impact of other
factors that may have either created such a condition or caused a 'baseline' level of
emotional distress to be present at the time of the alleged workplace injury.").
25. Desyatnik v. At. Casting & Eng'g Corp., No. C1V. 03-5441, 2008 WL
4724003, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2008) (quoting EEOC Decision No. 915.002, 1992
WL 189089, at *5 (July 14, 1992)).
26. Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996)
("[A]s a young, unwed mother who was walking an 'economic tightrope' and who
had just discovered she was pregnant for a second time, [plaintiff] was in a
particularly vulnerable position and was highly dependent upon her job.
Vulnerability is relevant to determining damages." (citing Pratt v. Brown Mach.
Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1240 (6th Cir. 1988))); seeJenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130
F.3d 1287, 1294-95 (8th Cir. 1997) (providing that a "[t]ortfeasor is liable for all
of [the] natural and proximate consequences" of his actions, which "include[d]
damages assessed ... for harm caused to a plaintiff who happens to have a fragile
psyche"); Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.
1987) ("Perhaps [plaintiff] was unusually sensitive, but a tortfeasor takes its victims
as it finds them .... In some cases unusual sensitivity will enhance the loss; in
others unusual hardiness will reduce it; payment of the actual damage in each case
will both compensate the victim and lead the injurer to take account of the full
consequences of its acts."); EEOC Decision No. 915.002, 1992 WL 189089, at *5
("The fact that the complaining party may be unusually emotionally sensitive and
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/9
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
fact-finder may also consider other factors that are relevant to
whether and to what extent the employer caused the employee's
emotional distress. "Awards for pain and suffering are highly
subjective and the assessment of damages is within the sound
discretion of the jury, especially when the jury must determine how
to compensate an individual for an injury not easily calculable in
economic terms.
2 8
Where a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages in
connection with an employment law case, the parties often dispute
which of the plaintiffs medical records, if any, are discoverable by
the defendant.
III. APPLICABLE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
A. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 26(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim
or defense-including . . . the identity and location of
persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.29
Relevance has been "construed broadly to encompass any
matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter
that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. ' '30 "On
incur great emotional harm from discriminatory conduct will not absolve the
respondent from responsibility for the greater emotional harm." (citing
Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1294)).
27. See, e.g., Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 852 F.2d 688, 690-91 (2d
Cir. 1988) (awarding $15,000 to the plaintiff in a failure-to-promote case instead of
the $50,000 to $150,000 he had requested because plaintiff was not subjected to
overt racism or public humiliation, had been offered other positions, caused some
of his own humiliation, and had not sought counseling).
28. Jenkins v. McLean Hotels, Inc., 859 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (1).
30. Marsico v. Sears Holding Corp., 370 F. App'x 658, 664 (6th Cir. 2010)
[Vol. 41:3
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the other hand, the relevance standard is 'not so liberal as to allow
a party to roam in shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter
which does not presently appear germane on the theory that it
might conceivably become so.""'
[W]hen the discovery sought appears relevant[,] . . . the
party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish
the lack of relevance by demonstrating that the requested
discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of
relevance as defined under . . . [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 26(b) (1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance
that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would
outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad
disclosure. :2
Furthermore, if "good cause" exists to believe that the
discovery would result in unwarranted "annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense" the court may take
various approaches to protect the party, including limiting or
prohibiting discovery into certain matters." Generally, where
emotional distress damages are sought by the plaintiff, a
defendant's effort to obtain medical records does not, without
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)).
31. St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Food
Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012
(D.C. Cir. 1997)).
32. EEOC v. Sheffield Fin., LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at *3
(M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) (quoting Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002
WL 181364, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2002)); see St. John, 274 F.R.D. at 15-17
(concluding that the burden of producing records for many years prior to the
event and the harm to the plaintiffs privacy interests from the disclosure
significantly outweighed "any marginal relevance for the majority of the time
period for which the defendant seeks records"); Barnett v. Pa. Consulting Grp.,
Inc., No. 04-1245 (RWR), 2007 WL 845886, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007)
(reversing magistrate's refusal to order production of plaintiffs pure medical
records and non-privileged mental health information where plaintiff failed to
explain why production of such information was irrelevant or that the "harm from
disclosure would outweigh its marginal relevance"); Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc.,
227 F.R.D. 467, 473-74 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (overruling relevancy objections where
plaintiffs failed to provide "disputed medical records for in camera review or
otherwise provide a description of the medical records sufficient to allow the
Court to independently determine relevance or weigh potential harm of
disclosure").
33. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(c)(1).
8
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34more, demonstrate such good cause. Likewise, even when a
defendant seeks to obtain medical records from more than one
source, this does not necessarily show that the discovery was
intended for an improper purpose35 or that it was cumulative or
duplicative.
3 6
Courts typically find that "the identities of health providers,
the dates of treatment and the nature of the treatment are relevant
to claims for emotional distress."" This type of information
provides preliminary information which can be used to further
evaluate the appropriate scope of discovery regarding the plaintiffs
medical records.3 Beyond this starting point, courts have vastly
different views on the relevancy of medical records.
When a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages, courts
often find that the plaintiffs medical records are relevant both to
causation and to damages because they could reveal other sources
34. See, e.g., Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 471 ("[C]ourts have routinely ordered
discovery of this information in cases where emotional distress damages are
sought. Plaintiffs have not shown that the request for this information was made in
order to harass them.").
35. EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 1:09CV700, 2011 WL 1260241, at *15
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (refusing to find that discovery requests directed toward
EEOC were propounded for an improper purpose, even though defendant had
previously served charging parties with subpoenas seeking the same information).
36. EEOC v. Premier Well Servs., LLC, No. 4:10CV1419 SWW, 2011 WL
2198285, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 3, 2011) ("In many cases, it is important to obtain
what should be the same documents from two different sources because tell-tale
differences may appear between them; and in many cases when a party obtains
what should be the same set of documents from two different sources a critical fact
in the litigation turns out to be that one set omitted a document that was in the
other set." (quoting Cofeyville Res. Refining & Mktg., LLC v. Liberty Surplus Ins.
Corp., No. 4:08mcOO017JLH, 2008 WL 4853620, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2008)));
see also EEOC v. Smith Bros. Truck Garage, Inc., 7:09-CV-00150-H, 2011 WL
102724, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2011) (finding subpoena not cumulative or
duplicative where EEOC had previously only agreed to produce a portion of
charging party's medical records).
37. Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 471 (emphasis omitted) (listing cases); cf. Simpson
v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Colo. 2004) (compelling plaintiff to
disclose names of physicians who prepared records during relevant time frame
referencing plaintiffs emotional or psychological condition, but not those who
treated her for physical injuries or conditions unrelated to allegations in the case).
38. For example, in EEOC v. Consolidated Realty, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00681, 2007
WL 1452967, at *2 (D. Nev. May 17, 2007), the court directed the EEOC to
provide defendant the identities of the charging party's healthcare providers,
dates of treatment, and nature of the treatment with sufficient specificity to
determine whether additional discovery was warranted.
1000 [Vol. 41:3
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of stress that may be impacting the plaintiffs emotional distress.
On the other hand, certain courts do not permit defendants to
obtain discovery on plaintiffs' psychological or medical histories
where the court finds the plaintiffs' harms were indivisible, thus
rendering such information irrelevant. Some courts allow
defendants to obtain medical records in order to see whether the
plaintiff reported her employment-related emotional distress to herS 41
medical provider. This is often premised, at least in part, on the
39. EEOC v. Sheffield Fin., LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at *4
(M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) (citing, inter alia, Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-
KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2002)); see, e.g., Owens v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 660 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding that
records relating to plaintiff's medical care, treatment, and counseling were
relevant to claim for "garden-variety" emotional damages under Title VII as well as
to defenses against emotional distress damages claims because the records could
reveal unrelated stressors that could have affected her emotional well-being);
Posey v. Calvert Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A. WMN-02-2130, 2003 WL 21516194,
at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2003) (denying plaintiff's motion for a protective order of
her medical records where plaintiff testified to prior use of antidepressants, "a
history of an abusive relationship with her alcoholic ex-husband and counseling
involving her son and daughters"); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-Z-1217,
2000 WL 1644154, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding that medical records
were relevant to claim for emotional distress damages and to defenses against
emotional distress damages claims because they could reveal unrelated stressors);
Ziemann v. Burlington Cnty. Bridge Comm'n, 155 F.R.D. 497, 506-07 (D.N.J.
1994) (requiring disclosure of plaintiffs marriage counseling records where
plaintiffs expert indicated that "current mental condition is due, in part, to the
experiences of" that marriage); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216,
223 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that, where sexual harassment plaintiffs claimed
emotional distress damages, the employer is entitled "to inquire into plaintiffs'
pasts for the purpose of showing that their emotional distress was caused at least in
part by events and circumstances that were not job related").
40. In Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997), the
plaintiffs in a class action sexual harassment case sought emotional distress
damages under the Minnesota Human Rights Act; in turn, defendants sought
"detailed medical histories, childhood experiences, domestic abuse, abortions,
and sexual relationships, etc." of each of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1292. The Eighth
Circuit stated that the special master should not have permitted broad discovery of
the plaintiffs' personal backgrounds, including domestic abuse, earlier illnesses,
and personal relationships, because he previously concluded that the plaintiffs'
emotional harm was indivisible; thus defendants should have been foreclosed
from seeking apportionment, rendering the plaintiffs' prior psychological and
medical histories irrelevant. Id. at 1292-94.
41. Hannah v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 3:12CV1361 (JCH), 2014 WL
2515221, at *6 n.9 (D. Conn. June 4, 2014) ("[D]efendants are entitled to these
records to see whether plaintiffs ever complained of mental anguish to a medical
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/9
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
assumption that medical records may be relevant for impeachment
42purposes.
B. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled
"Physical and Mental Examinations," states:
The court where the action is pending may order a party
whose mental or physical condition ... is in controversy to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably
licensed or certified examiner .... The order . . . may be
made only on motion for good cause and on notice to allS 41
parties and the person to be examined.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that Rule 35
requires more than mere relevance. 44 "The general consensus is, 45
that 'garden-variety emotional distress allegations that are part
and parcel of the plaintiffs underlying claim are insufficient to
place the plaintiffs mental condition 'in controversy' for purposes
of Rule 35(a). 46 Instead, most federal courts find that a mental
provider in relation to their terminations, and whether any other matters
contributed to or caused plaintiffs' alleged mental anguish.").
42. Michelman v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., No. 11-CV-3633 (MKB), 2013 WL
664893, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013) (affirming magistrate's ruling that medical
records from plaintiffs cardiologist were relevant for impeachment purposes
where plaintiff testified at her deposition that she had received treatment for chest
pains from her cardiologist).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
44. Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 116-18 (1964).
45. As explained in Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Department of Social Services, 194
F.R.D. 445, 449 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 2000):
"Garden-variety" means ordinary or commonplace. Webster's New
World Dictionary 656 (3d College ed. 1988). Garden-variety emotional
distress, therefore, is ordinary or commonplace emotional distress.
Garden-variety emotional distress is that which [is] simple or usual. In
contrast, emotional distress that is not garden-variety may be complex,
such as that resulting in a specific psychiatric disorder, or may be
unusual, such as to disable one from working.
See also John Doe I v. Mulcahy, Inc., Civil No. 08-306 (DWF/SRN), 2008 WL
4572515, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2008) (recognizing popularity of this phrase
with parties and courts, but noting the Court's "distaste for the phrase" "[t]o the
extent that use of the 'garden variety' phrase diminishes or belittles the very real
emotional distress a plaintiff can experience when an employer violates civil rights
laws").
46. Kuminka v. At. Cnty., 551 F. App'x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Bowen v.
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examination is warranted where, in addition to a claim of
emotional distress, the case involves one or more of the following
factors set forth in Turner v. Imperial Stores-
1) a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress; 2) an allegation of a specific mental
or psychiatric injury or disorder; 3) a claim of unusually
severe emotional distress; 4) plaintiffs offer of expert
testimony to support a claim of emotional distress; and/or
5) plaintiffs concession that his or her mental condition
is 'in controversy' within the meaning of Rule 35 (a) .4 7
C. Whether the "In Controversy" and "Good Cause" Requirements of Rule
35 or the Relevancy Standard of Rule 26 Applies
There is disagreement among federal courts regarding
whether defendants must prove the relevancy standard of Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the "in controversy" and
"good cause" requirements of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to obtain a plaintiffs medical records."
Most courts apply the Rule 26 relevancy standard to the
production of medical records.49 These courts take the position
that "a party's medical condition can be relevant [under Rule 26],
yet not be 'in controversy' within the meaning of Rule 35. Under
Parking Auth. of Camden, 214 F.R.D. 188, 193 (D.N.J. 2003)).
47. 161 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1995); see also EEOC v. Consol. Resorts, Inc.,
No. 2:06-CV-LDG-GWF, 2008 WL 942289, at *6 (D. Nev. Apr. 7, 2008) (listing cases
applying these factors).
48. See Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 267 F.R.D. 257, 268-69 (D.
Minn. 2007) (recognizing inconsistent decisions within the district court of
Minnesota on this issue); see also infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000)
("[Plaintiffs] claims [of extreme emotional distress] against [defendant] placed
her medical condition at issue, making the [medical records] sought by
[defendant] relevant, and absent a showing of bad faith, discoverable."); St. John
v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2011); Mulcahy, Inc., 2008 WL 4572515, at
*4 (citing EEOC v. Sheffield Fin., LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at *5
(M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007)); Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 177 F.R.D.
376, 381 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
50. Ricks v. Abbott Labs., 198 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Md. 2001); see also Combe v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-142 TS, 2009 WL 3584883, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 26,
2009) (concluding that Rule 26, not Rule 35, applied to discovery of medical
records of plaintiffs who sought "'garden variety' emotional distress"); Owens v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 659-60 (D. Kan. 2004) (noting that,
12
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this approach, a court could deny a Rule 35 mental examination on
the grounds that an employee's mental health is not in controversy,
but still potentially find that the employee's medical records are
discoverable because they are relevant.5'
There are some courts, however, that assert that Rule 35 not
only applies to physical and mental examinations, but also applies
to the production of a plaintiff's medical records. 52 One district
court judge stated that in making the "threshold showing of
relevance," the "analysis necessarily implicates Rule 35 (a),... given
the clear parallels between the analysis of whether a mental
condition is 'in controversy,' for purposes of a mental health
examination, and whether the issue of mental health is 'in
controversy' for purposes of compelling a party to turn over her
medical records."" Other courts applying the Rule 35 standard to
address the discoverability of a plaintiffs medical records assert
that the standard for whether a plaintiff has waived the
psychotherapist-patient or physician-patient privilege, and/or her
right to privacy in her medical records, is the same as the standard
54required for a Rule 35 physical or mental examination.
although some courts have found that a "garden-variety" emotional distress claim
may not place the plaintiffs mental condition "in controversy for purposes of
justifying a mental examination under Rule 35," this does not automatically
exempt them from discovery under Rule 26).
51. See, e.g., Bowen v. Parking Auth. of Camden, 214 F.R.D. 188, 195 (D.N.J.
2003) ("The finding that the defendants are not entitled to a Rule 35 mental
examination does not, however, preclude the defendants from obtaining discovery
concerning the plaintiff's psychiatric history. To the contrary, the psychological
history of the plaintiff is governed by Rule 26(b), not Rule 35(a)."); Ricks, 198
F.R.D. at 650 (holding that the employee's mental condition was not in
controversy for the purpose of a Rule 35 mental examination and stating that its
holding did not conflict with its previous denial of plaintiff's motion to quash the
defendant's subpoena seeking plaintiffs medical records).
52. See, e.g., Blake v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. CIV 03-6084 PAM/RLE, 2004
WL 5254174, at *7 (D. Minn. May 19, 2004) (holding that, "absent some specific,
particularized showing, the production of medical records are governed by the 'in
controversy' requirement of Rule 35"); see also Balcom v. Univ. of Indianapolis,
No.l:09-CV-0057-LJM-DML, 2010 WL 2346768, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 9, 2010)
(citations omitted) (analyzing a motion to compel plaintiffs medical records and
noting that "[a] claim for emotional distress damages, without more, is not
sufficient to put mental condition 'in controversy' within the meaning of Rule
35").
53. Blake, 2004 WL 5254174, at *5.
54. See, e.g., Dochniak v. Dominium Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 240 F.R.D. 451, 452
(D. Minn. 2006) (affirming magistrate's report and recommendation applying
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Frequently, parties and the court will analyze whether a
plaintiff is claiming "garden-variety" emotional distress damages;
however, courts have different definitions of the terms and may
reach opposite results.55 One major reason for the different
opinions is that some courts view the issue through the lens of Rule
26, while others analyze it under Rule 35.57
Rule 35 in denying defendant's motion to compel discovery of plaintiffs medical
records); EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding
that plaintiff had not waived her right to privacy under state or federal
constitutions, and reasoning that "if anything, delving into a plaintiffs medical or
psychiatric records is even more invasive than conducting a medical or
psychological examination, and that the standard for waiver should be at least as
rigorous" as in cases addressing whether a plaintiff has to submit to a Rule 35
medical examination); see infra Part V.D (regarding waiver of privilege).
55. Simply labeling a claim as "garden-variety" is not always helpful:
The term "garden variety" was bandied about repeatedly in the
parties' pleadings and in their arguments at the hearing. As
demonstrated by the cases cited by the parties, however, the definition
of the term is, at best, nebulous. Courts have attached the label to
various sorts of claims, often with polar results. Compare Combe v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3584883, *2 (D. Utah 2009) (holding that
"[m]edical records relating to treatment and counseling are relevant
even when [a] plaintiff seeks 'garden variety' emotional damages"),
with Wright v. Marshall Mize Ford, No. 1:09-cv-139, [Doc. 16] (ED.
Tenn. Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that a plaintiffs mental health records
for reasons unrelated to his termination were "undiscoverable as
irrelevant" to "garden variety" emotional distress claims). The case law
has been ambivalent even within single opinions. See Kennedy v.
Cingular Wireless, 2007 WL 2407044 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing as a
"general principle" that medical records "which might tend to show
other stressors . . . at or about the same time [as the alleged wrong]
and which could account for some or all of the emotional suffering...
are discoverable" even for "garden variety" claims, but also indicating
that if a plaintiff seeks damages only for "the emotional distress that
normally accompanies a wrongful discharge," then "other stressors ....
whether revealed in records of medical treatment or elsewhere," might
be "completely irrelevant").
Based on a review of the cases, the Court concludes that simply
labeling a claim as "garden variety" is unhelpful to the analysis. The
Court therefore declines to limit discovery merely because a plaintiff
characterizes her claim that way.
Butler v. Rue 21, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-9, 2011 WL 1484151, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 19,
2011).
56. See, e.g., Hannah v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12CV1361 (CH), 2014
WL 2515221, at *2, *6 n.9 (D. Conn.June 4, 2014) (using Rule 26(b) as the legal
standard and finding that, despite plaintiffs waiving damages for physical injuries,
14
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the court agreed with defendants that "production of the medical records are
warranted so that defendants may test plaintiffs' claims of mental anguish");
Carpenter v. Res-Care Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-08047, 2013 WL 1750464, at
*3 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 23, 2013) ("Notwithstanding Plaintiffs representation in this
case that she does not intend to offer medical records to corroborate her claims,
she alleges that Defendant has caused her to suffer emotional distress and she
seeks compensation for that injury. As a result, discovery of her medical records is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."); St. John v.
Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 15-17 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs argument
that his medical records were irrelevant even though he represented that he has
not sought treatment from any medical provider for any injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct and indicated he would not offer any expert testimony or
medical records as evidence); Moore v. Chertoff, No. 00-953 (RWR) (DAR), 2006
WL 1442447, at *3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2006) ("Whether plaintiffs intend to prove
their damages claims with expert testimony has no bearing on the relevance of
plaintiffs' medical records, or their ability to establish potential alternative causes
for plaintiffs' symptoms."); Owens v. Sprint/United Mgt. Co., 221 F.R.D. 657, 660
(D. Kan. 2004) (finding that "records relating to [Plaintiffs] medical care,
treatment, and counseling are relevant to the claims she seeks to assert for her
'garden variety' emotional damages under Title VII" as well as to "Defendant's
defenses against Plaintiffs emotional distress damages claim because her medical
records may reveal stressors unrelated to Defendant that may have affected
Plaintiff's well being"); Walker v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. Civ. 00-2604 MJD/JGL,
2002 WL 32539635, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2002) (using Rule 26 and stating,
"regardless of whether Plaintiff intends to introduce his medical records or offer
medical testimony to prove his alleged emotional distress, [Defendant] is entitled
to determine whether Plaintiff's relevant medical history indicates that his alleged
emotional distress was caused in part by events and circumstances independent of
[Defendant's] allegedly adverse employment action"); Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No.
00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2002) (finding that
plaintiff's intent not to present expert testimony in support of her emotional
distress claim did not make medical records and information any less relevant);
LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at *2, *5 (D.
Colo. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding that plaintiffs medical record information was
relevant to her claim for emotional distress damages even though plaintiff had
only asked for damages for pain and suffering, embarrassment, and humiliation,
and had not asserted a separate cause of action for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress, or alleged a specific mental or psychiatric injury,
or unusually severe emotional distress).
57. See, e.g., Dochniak, 240 F.R.D. at 452 (applying Rule 35 and denying
defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to produce authorization for release of her
medical records from the counselor she "saw following her rape, from her
neurologist, and from doctors who performed her two elective surgeries" where
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D. Rules of Evidence
Rules 401, 402, 403, 404, and 412 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence 5s apply to issues relating to the admissibility of medical
records.59 For example, "a full personality inventory of [a]
plaintiffs character . . . unrelated to her psychological or
emotional condition" would not be relevant and may be confusing
to a jury.60 Likewise, evidence that is unrelated to causation or
damages, but simply bears on a plaintiffs character, is outside the
6"
proper limits of discovery. Some courts take a broad view of
discovery under Rule 26 and wait until trial to further limit
discovery of medical records."'
58. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b)
the fact is of consequence in determining the action."); id. R. 402 ("Relevant
evidence is admissible unless ... the United States Constitution; a federal statute;
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court [provide otherwise].
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible."); id. R. 403 ("The court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence."); id. R. 404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character or character trait
is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait."); id. R. 412(a), (b)(2) (providing that
evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to
prove a victim's sexual predisposition is inadmissible in a civil or criminal case
involving alleged sexual misconduct, but such evidence may be offered in a civil
case "to prove a victim's sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative
value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair
prejudice to any party"). "The court may admit evidence of a victim's reputation
only if the victim has placed it in controversy." Id. R. 412(b) (2).
59. See Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D. 617, 619-20 (D. Utah 1995).
60. Id. (holding that in a sexual harassment action alleging damages for
"severe psychological and emotional distress," the employer was not entitled to full
"personality inventory of [the employee's] character," unrelated to the condition
at issue (citing FED. R. EVID. 403)).
61. Id. at 620 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(a), 412; Stair v. Lehigh Valley
Carpenters Local Union, 813 F. Supp. 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
62. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) ("The court can be the gatekeeper of the ultimate admissibility of the
evidence through a Rule 403 balancing analysis at trial."); Hawkins v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-688, 2006 WL 2422596, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2006)
(concluding that defendant met its burden of showing that certain medical
records fell within the scope of Rule 26(b) but noting that it did not necessarily
mean that defendant would ultimately be able to overcome other barriers to
admissibility at trial, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403); Moore v. Metro. Water
16
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IV. SCOPE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION AND RECORDS
Even when medical records are relevant or "in controversy,"
the court must still resolve the issue of which specific medical
records the defendants are entitled to during discovery. "Certainly,
some conditions, either by their nature or by their temporal
relationship to the alleged injury, may be able to be ruled out
categorically as simply irrelevant to a claim of emotional distress,"
such as a broken bone ten years before the unlawful conduct.
Conversely, if a plaintiff
suffered a serious physical injury only a year or two before,
and it had persisted up to the date of the alleged
emotional injury, it would be much more reasonable to
infer that her physical injury and the treatment regimen
had some ongoing impact on the state of her emotional
health, and to permit at least a limited inquiry into the
details of that condition.64
There is a lack of uniformity on how courts limit the
discoverability of medical records in terms of time frame and
substance.6 5
Reclamation Dist., No. 02 C 4040, 2005 WL 2007291, at *7-8 (N.D. 11. Aug. 12,
2005) (rejecting defendant's motion for a new trial and concluding that the court
properly granted the sexual harassment plaintiffs motion in limine under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 to redact references to the terminated pregnancies from her
medical records); Posey v. Calvert Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A. WMN-02-2130,
2003 WL 21516194, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2003) (noting that Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 pertains to admissibility of evidence at trial: "Procedures set forth in
subsection (c) do not apply to discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or
predisposition in civil cases, which will continue to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P.
26" (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412(c) advisory committee's note)); Kirchner v. Mitsui
& Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 130 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting the fact that the court
compelled plaintiff to produce certain documents does not mean that they will
necessarily be admissible at trial (citing FED. R. EVID. 403)).
63. Hawkins, 2006 WL 2422596, at *2.
64. Id.
65. Compare Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131, 136 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that because plaintiff placed mental state at issue, plaintiff could only
prevent discovery by withdrawing claim), with Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int'l, Inc., 962
F. Supp. 701, 708-09 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that even though plaintiff had
placed mental state at issue, the possibility that discovery could end the
psychotherapist privilege should still be considered).
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A. Temporal Scope of Medical Records
Virtually all courts would agree that a plaintiff's "emotional
distress claim does not, however, give [d]efendants an unfettered
right to pursue discovery into [plaintiff's] entire medical history."'
Accordingly, one important aspect regarding the scope of the
medical records is what the appropriate temporal scope is.
Courts typically find that "contemporaneous medical recordsS ,67
documenting the existence of emotional distress are relevant.""
Moreover, most plaintiffs would want to disclose their medical
records to defendants in order to demonstrate "the existence and
severity of the claimed [emotional distress] ."6
A more difficult issue arises when assessing the relevance of
medical records for treatment before the unlawful conduct, and for
what time period these records remain relevant. Some courts find
that medical records relating to medical treatment from a certain
period of time before the unlawful conduct may be relevant.
66. Manessis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359SASDF, 2002 WL
31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002).
67. Hawkins, 2006 WL 2422596, at *2.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Flores v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 4:12CV3089, 2013 WL 1091044,
at *5 (D. Neb. Mar. 15, 2013) (concluding that defendant's request for over
thirteen years of medical records was "not reasonably calculated to lead to
discoverable evidence" and limiting the time frame of discoverable records to "five
years preceding the date of the alleged injury"); St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D.
12, 16-17, 21 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting defendant's request for nine years of
plaintiff's medical records in a denial of a promotion case and finding "that the
relevant time period . . . should only extend from two years prior to the first date
of the alleged discrimination through the present"); EEOC v. Smith Bros. Truck
Garage, Inc., No. 7:09-CV-00150-H, 2011 WL 102724, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 11,
2011) (granting "in part [in an ADA case] [p]laintiffs motion for a protective
order to limit the documents produced by the medical providers to the relevant
period" of two years prior to the incident at issue through the date of production);
EEOC v. Consol. Realty, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00681-JCM-LRL, 2007 WL 1452967, at
*2 (D. Nev. May 17, 2007) (ruling that defendant had "not shown good cause as to
why the production" of medical "information should encompass the ten-year
period before [plaintiffs] layoff' and limiting the relevant time period to five
years prior to the plaintiffs layoff through the present); Garrett v. Sprint PCS, No.
00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *3 (D. Kan. 2002) (restricting discovery to
"three years prior to the time the discriminatory conduct" allegedly occurred until
the present); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at
*2 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding defendants were entitled to discovery of
plaintiff's medical records for any condition for a period of five years prior to the
events giving rise to plaintiffs complaint and continuing to the present time). But
18
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Other courts link the relevant temporal scope of medical records to
the date the employee began working for the defendant. 7 Still
other courts find that the date on which the plaintiffs mental
health issues arose or when a particularly stressful event in the
plaintiffs life occurred should coincide with the appropriate
'71discovery period for medical records. Certain courts simply pick a
number of years from the date of the order that they deem to be a
reasonable amount of time or agree that the time frame sought by
defendants is not unreasonable.
Courts may also find relevant some medical records that post-
date the unlawful conduct.73 As one court explained:
see Anderson v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 06cv991-WQH, 2007 WL
1994059, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2007) (concluding that requested records
documenting plaintiffs medical treatment while employed by defendant were not
relevant to the emotional distress plaintiff may have experienced after his
termination).
70. See, e.g., EEOC v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114, 123 (W.D.N.Y.
2009) (granting in part defendant employer's request in a sexual harassment case
to compel discovery of plaintiffs' medical records for the purpose of examining
emotional distress claims, with limitation to the period from one year prior to one
year subsequent to each plaintiffs employment, instead of the ten-year period
sought by defendants); Chiquelin v. Efunds Corp., No. 02Civ.5152LAPDFE, 2003
WL 21459581 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003) (ordering plaintiff to produce all
medical records since January 1, 1998, which was about one year before plaintiff
began working for defendants, where plaintiff produced the file of the psychiatrist
who began treating him after his May 2001 termination, but defense sought to
admit all of plaintiffs medical records dating back to 1990).
71. See, e.g., Tavares v. Lawrence & Mem'l Hosp., No. 3:11-CV-770, 2012 WL
4321961, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2012) (denying motion to quash subpoena of
marital therapist or to narrow the time frame for discovery-over seven years,
which pre-dated plaintiffs termination by over five years-because the court
reasoned that discovery regarding plaintiff's therapy occurring about eight months
after her husband's disability may be relevant to the stressfil events and
circumstances that preceded her termination); Doe v. Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562,
570 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding that the one-year time limit ordered by the
magistrate was too restrictive and should be extended to include 1994, given the
evidence that showed the plaintiff received counseling that year).
72. See, e.g., Ipox v. EHC Fin. Servs., LLC, No. C07-5606RJB, 2008 WL
4534366, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2008) (permitting discovery of medical records
for about the past ten years, which was what defendant requested).
73. See McKinney v. Del. Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., Civil Action No. 08-1054, 2009
WL 750181, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009) (noting it was unclear from plaintiffs
complaint whether she was "asserting a claim for continuing emotional stress
damages, or if the emotional distress damages she claims are attributable to
[d]efendants are cut off at some past date certain," and rejecting plaintiffs
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To allow Plaintiffs to make a claim for emotional
distress, but shield information related to their claim, is
similar to shielding other types of medical records. For
instance, if the injury at issue were to the knee, and
Plaintiff had sustained a subsequent knee injury requiring
treatment, Plaintiffs would not be able to hide the details
of the subsequent knee injury because of privilege or
privacy considerations. In order to allege and recover for
a harm, Plaintiffs need to show the existence and extent
of the harm. The particular value of the harm is best left
to the fact-finder, after a careful view of the facts. The only
way to adequately review the facts is to bring to light
relevant information.74
Where the plaintiff claims ongoing emotional distress, courts
typically find that medical records should be discoverable through
the present. 5 However, where a plaintiff represents that the
emotional distress has ceased and that she does not intend to seek
emotional distress damages after a certain date, medical records
after that point in time are usually not deemed relevant.76
Because of the highly factual nature of each case, the types of
claims, and the courts' own views of relevancy, courts reach
different results about the number of years of medical records that
should be permitted in discovery.7
argument that her current medical records were not relevant).
74. Sanchez v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 131, 136 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
75. See, e.g., St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 15-22, 16 n.2, 17 n.3
(D.D.C. 2011) (compelling plaintiff to produce medical records through the
present where his interrogatory response relating to his damages stated that
"[p]laintiff has been, and continues to be, injured as a result of mental and
emotional distress ... caused by [d]efendant's illegal actions in an amount to be
determined by ajury").
76. See, e.g., Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 306-07 (D. Colo. 1998)
(concluding that, where plaintiff "only sought professional counseling one time in
the past decade," which was in connection with a family member's death, and
represented "that the emotional distress she suffered as a result of defendant's
actions had ceased as of the date she went to her first counseling session," those
counseling records were irrelevant; the court limited the range of discovery of
medical records to prior to that time).
77. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. For example, in cases
under the ADA, in addition to seeking emotional distress, there may be other
issues that affect a court's determination of the relevant time period for the
plaintiffs records. See Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, No. 3:13-CV-797,
2014 WL 2601765, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2014) ("In an action under the ADA, a
20
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B. Substantive Scope of Medical Records
Courts take vastly different views on what should fall within the
substantive scope of discoverable medical records. Some courts
permit the defendant to obtain only the plaintiff's mental health
records." Other courts permit discovery relating to the treatment
or diagnosis of a mental, emotional, or psychological condition,
irrespective of whether the provider is a mental healthS 79
professional. An even more encompassing approach is to permit
not only the discovery of medical information relating to the
treatment or diagnosis of a mental, emotional, or psychological
condition, but also medical records relating to any physical or
mental manifestations of the issues that the plaintiff claims to have
suffered at the hand of the defendant.s° These courts sometimes
plaintiff's medical history is relevant in its entirety. It is impossible to answer the
most basic questions, such as whether the plaintiff was generally foreclosed from
similar employment by reason of a major life activity impairment, or otherwise
qualified given a reasonable accommodation, or what a reasonable
accommodation would have been .... [And it is relevant to whether] plaintiffs
inability to work without accommodation is the result of something other than the
claimed disability .. " (quoting Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc., 920 F. Supp.
90, 92 (E.D.N.C. 1996))).
78. See, e.g., Kirchner v. Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 128-29 (M.D. Tenn.
1998) (requiring plaintiff to produce the psychiatrist, psychologist, and social
worker documents during specified time frame).
79. See, e.g., Hupp v. San Diego Cnty., No. 12cv0492 GPC(RBB), 2013 WL
5408644, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013) (modifying subpoenas to limit records
sought to those reflecting plaintiff's mental health issues); Walker v. Nw. Airlines
Corp., No. Civ.00-2604 MJD/JGL, 2002 WL 32539635, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 28,
2002) ("[Defendant] is directed to modify its authorization form such that it
authorizes only the release of medical information pertaining to the treatment or
diagnosis of a mental, emotional, or psychological condition."); Melaski v. Allco
Enters., Inc., No. CIV. 95-1328-FR, 1996 WL 50974, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 24, 1996)
(ruling that the plaintiff need not disclose her general medical records but only
the medical records relevant to the plaintiffs mental and/or emotional
condition).
80. For example, in Kersten v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., No. 11-1036,
2011 WL 5373777, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2011), the plaintiff asserted in her
initial disclosures that she "suffered emotional distress, including sleepless nights,
anxiety and panic" due to the defendant's unlawful conduct. In that case, the
court ordered plaintiff to provide defendant with "all records from any mental
health provider (e.g. psychologist, psychiatrist, therapist, counsel[or] or social
worker) pertaining to any diagnoses or treatment for mental, emotional and
psychological issues" and "any records from any medical provider . . . that
mention, discuss or reflect sleep loss, anxiety or panic (whether or not [the
1012 [Vol. 41:3
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rule that certain types of records can be categorically excluded."'
Other courts allow the discoverability of medical records relating to
physical maladies that the plaintiff sought treatment for during the
relevant time period that admittedly resulted in emotional5 2
distress. Finally, in certain cases plaintiffs have been required to
plaintiff] sought treatment or received a diagnosis for these physical or mental
manifestations)." Id. at *3; see also Hannah v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
3:12CV1361 UCH), 2014 WL 2515221, at *6 (D. Conn. June 4, 2014) (holding
that, where one plaintiff testified that he suffered "mental anguish, stress, weight
loss, sleep disruption, and other consequences as a result of [defendant's]
conduct," and it was anticipated that two of the other plaintiffs would testify
similarly, defendant should be entitled to "examine their medical records that
reflect 'any consultation with or treatment by a medical provider for complaints
for mental anguish regardless of the cause, or reflect medical conditions the
symptoms of or treatment for which could have resulted in the same type of
physical symptoms the plaintiffs have described'" (quoting EEOC v. Nichols Gas &
Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114,123 (W.D.N.Y. 2009))).
81. See, e.g., Walker, 2002 WL 32539635, at *5 (directing defendant to modify
its authorization and specifying that "[t]he information to be disclosed may
include: discharge summaries (if related to mental or emotional treatment),
consultation reports (if related to mental or emotional treatment),
psychiatric/psychological/mental health records, and chemical dependency
treatment records. Laboratory reports, x-rays, pathology reports, physical therapy
records, and information concerning physical examinations are to be expressly
excluded' (emphasis added)).
82. In Manessis v. New York City Department of Transportation, No. 02 CIV.
359SASDF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002) (citation omitted),
the court stated:
Defendants, however, are not entitled to pursue discovery into
treatments [the Plaintiff] may have received for any physical ailments,
unless [the Plaintiff] has first indicated through deposition testimony
or other discovery responses that a particular physical ailment or
ailments caused him emotional distress during the relevant period. If,
for example, [the Plaintiff] has testified that a certain medical problem
caused him to be upset, or to suffer anxiety or stress during the same
period as the period of his alleged emotional injury, then Defendants
may appropriately seek medical records concerning that underlying
medical problem.
See also St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) ("[D]efendant is
not entitled to production of all of the plaintiff's medical records, but only records
that have a logical connection to the plaintiffs claims of injury. Such records
include any non-privileged mental or emotional health records, records involving
new medical issues for which the plaintiff first sought treatment during the
Relevant Time Period, and records involving a medical condition that the
defendant has established, through other discovery, may have caused the plaintiff
emotional distress." (citation omitted)); EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No.
22
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disclose all of their medical records for the specified time frame. 3
One such court reasoned:
Because of the broad range and generalized nature of the
symptoms, and the difficulty of determining (at least by a
layperson) the range of possible symptoms of various
medical conditions and the possible side effects of
medication, fairness requires that the medical records of
[certain] claimants be disclosed for a relevant period of
time.84
V. PRIVILEGE
Even if medical records are relevant, it does not necessarily
mean they are discoverable. Plaintiffs often move for protective
orders, move to quash subpoenas, and oppose motions to compel
the production of their medical records on the grounds that such
records are privileged. Defendants, on the other hand, typically
insist that by seeking emotional distress damages, the plaintiff has
waived the privilege. Defendants often retort that plaintiffs cannot
use the privilege "as both a shield and a sword. Thus, courts
addressing the issue of medical records generally must analyze the
applicable privileges and whether such privileges have been waived.
1:09CV700, 2011 WL 1260241, at *15 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that the
EEOC failed to show that medical records-including records relating to two of
the charging parties' car accidents that resulted in significant medical treatment
during the time frame that they alleged defendants conduct caused them medical
expenses and emotional distress-lacked relevance).
83. Wooten v. Certainteed Corp., Nos. 08-2508-CM, 08-2520-CM, 2009 WL
2407715, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 2009) (granting defendant's motion to compel
medical records for a five-year period, despite plaintiff's argument that the request
was not relevant to the extent it sought information regarding every medical issue
plaintiff experienced during that time period); LeFave v. Symbios, Inc., No. CIV.A.
99-Z-1217, 2000 WL 1644154, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding defendants
were entitled to discovery of plaintiff's medical records for any condition, not just
her psychological counseling records).
84. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. at 123 (concluding such for claimants
who consulted with their primary care physicians about work-related stress, as well
as claimants who described during their EEOC interviews physical manifestations
of the emotional distress they allegedly suffered, such as anxiety attacks, nausea,
sweats, severe headaches, insomnia, and stomach aches and problems).
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A. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court held in Jaffee v.
Redmond that "confidential communications between a licensed
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or
treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence."8" In Jaffee, the Supreme Court
explained that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to
confidential communications with licensed psychiatrists and
psychologists, as well as with licensed social workers in the course of
psychotherapy. 8 The Court rejected a balancing test (i.e., weighing
the patient's interest in privacy against the evidentiary need for
disclosure). The Court reasoned that in order for a privilege to
serve its purpose, an individual engaging in the confidential
communication must be able to confidently determine whether his
discussions will be protected. "  It explained, "An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all. '
Likewise, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized in
state courts.9' Generally, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
92statutory, but in a few cases it is based on common-law principles.The statutes mostly differ with respect to which types of specialists
86. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). For case law regarding when federal courts are
governed by state law of privilege under Rule 501, see Bruce I. McDaniel,
Annotation, Situations in Which Federal Courts Are Governed by State Law of Privilege
Under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 A.L.R. FED. 259 (1980). This rule
provides that the common law governs claims of privilege unless the U.S.
Constitution, a federal statute, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court provides
otherwise. FED. R. EVID. 501. However, "in a civil case, state law governs privilege
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision." Id.
87. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15-16.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 17-18.
90. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393
(1981)).
91. See Helen A. Anderson, The Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and "Garden
Variety" Emotional Distress, 21 GEO. MASON L. REv. 117, 147-52 (2013) ("All of the
states had recognized the privilege by the time of Jaffee, although the laws varied in
scope.").
92. B. W. Best, Annotation, Privilege, in Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings,
Arising from Relationship Between Psychiatrist or Psychologist and Patient, 44 A.L.R.3d 24
§ 3[a] (1972).
24
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in mental diseases are covered by the privilege (e.g., psychiatrists or
psychologists) .
B. Physician-Patient Privilege
The United States Supreme Court, however, has not
recognized the existence of a physician-patient privilege under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 9' Because there was no physician-
patient privilege at federal common law, courts "have been all but
unanimous" in refusing to recognize a privilege under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 501.
On the other hand, the vast majority of states have statutes
codifying the physician-patient privilege.96
C. Not Privileged
Even when there is a privilege available, most courts hold that
the names of mental health care providers and dates of treatment
are not subject to the privilege because the privilege only protects
actual communications between the patient and the therapist. 97
93. Id. § 3[b].
94. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) ("[P]hysician-patient
evidentiary privilege is unknown to the common law."); see alsoJaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-
11 (discussing the need for a psychotherapist-patient privilege and noting that
unlike the physician-patient relationship, the psychotherapist-patient relationship
is dependent upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust).
95. 25 KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5522
n.500 (1st ed. 2014); see also United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790, 801-02 (7th Cir.)
("[W]e can find no circuit authority in support of a physician-patient privilege."),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1010 (2007); 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 98 (7th ed. 2013). But see, e.g., EEOC v. Serramonte, 237 F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (finding medical records privilege under the rights of privacy in state
and federal law).
96. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARYPRIVILEGES § 6.2.6 (2014).
97. Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 471 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(citing, inter alia, Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 219 n.4 (D.NJ. 2000));
Vinson v. Humana, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 624, 627 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Kiermeier v.
Woodfield Nissan, Inc., No. 98 C 3260, 1999 WL 759485, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7,
1999); Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 310 (N.D. Il. 1999). But see
Thomas-Young v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps., No. 1:12-CV-01410-AWI, 2013 WL
3481693, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2013) (denying defendant's motion to compel
identity of all of plaintiffs medical providers and noting California district courts
have held that such information is protected by the plaintiffs right to privacy; but
permitting defendant to question plaintiff regarding dates of treatment, stressors,
1016 [Vol. 41:3
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Accordingly, objecting to the production of such information on
the basis of privilege will generally be unsuccessful. There is a split
of case law about whether privilege encompasses diagnoses and the
nature of treatment. On a related note, "information gleaned and
recorded by non-psychotherapists that happens to implicate [a
plaintiffs] mental health" is not subject to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.X)
D. Waiver
When there is an applicable privilege, it is not enough for the
defendant to merely assert that it is entitled to the records because
they may have relevant information that would assist the defendant100
with the presentation of its case. This holds true even if the
defendant could plausibly assert that the records could reveal
significant evidence contradicting the plaintiff's evidence or
undermining the plaintiffs truthfulness.' That would be like
arguing to a court that the plaintiffs communications with his
attorney may have relevant information to help the defense or
contain evidence helpful to impeaching the plaintiff and thus
should be turned over.
Privileged communications are not discoverable unless there
has been a waiver of the privilege. °2 A party can waive the
psychotherapist-patient and physician-patient privileges either by
express or implied waiver.'" For example, a plaintiff expressly
waives the privilege when she signs and produces a medical
and other factors that potentially contributed to her alleged emotional distress).
98. Stark v. Hartt Transp. Sys., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91-92 (D. Me. 2013)
(recognizing split and citing cases; concluding that the privilege does shield such
information).
99. Id. (citing United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771, 783 (8th Cir. 2012);
EEOC v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114, 120 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)).
100. Kronenberg v. Baker & McKenzie LLP, 747 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985 (N.D.
I1. 2010).
101. Id. ("Parties ... do not forfeit [a privilege] merely by taking a position
that the evidence might contradict." (quoting United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S.
317, 323 (1992))).
102. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (extending Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 to psychotherapist-patient privilege, which may be waived "[1]ike
other testimonial privileges" (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.4
(1996))).
103. Id. (citing John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir.
2003)).
26
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authorization for the defendant to obtain her medical records.0
"[W] aiver may be implied in circumstances where it is called for in
the interests of fairness," including "when the party attempts to use
the privilege both as 'a shield and a sword.""" Testimonial
privileges, like constitutional privileges, are personal and cannot be
waived vicariously; 10 6 therefore, "waiver can only result from action
of the plaintiff, not from that of the defendant."' 7 In other words,
"a plaintiff does not put his mental state in issue merely by
acknowledging he suffers from [a mental health issue] for which he
is not seeking recompense; nor may a defendant overcome the
privilege by putting the plaintiff's mental state in issue."10 8 Certain
plaintiffs strategically decide not to pursue emotional distress
damages to try to circumvent any argument that there has been a
waiver of the privilege.l0 9
When a plaintiff pursues emotional distress damages in an
employment law case, the discoverability of his medical records
often hinges largely on how the particular judge or jurisdiction
views the issue of waiver. Since Jaffee, federal courts have grappled
104. Tavares v. Lawrence & Mem'l Hosp., No. 3:11-CV-770 (CSH), 2012 WL
4321961, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2012) (concluding that when a plaintiff named
her marital therapist in her interrogatory response, and signed and provided a
blank medical authorization to release to defendant's counsel information relating
to treatment, plaintiff expressly waived any privilege to marital therapy records for
the stated time period).
105. Jacobs v. Conn. Cmty. Technical Colls., 258 F.R.D. 192, 195 (D. Conn.
2009) (quoting Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d. Cir. 2008)).
106. Kronenberg, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (citing, inter alia, United States v.
Hatcher, 323 F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003)).
107. United States v. Hatcher, 323 F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003) (attorney-
client privilege); Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 850 (1st Cir. 1984) (attorney-
client privilege); Kronenberg, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (citing In re Sims, 534 F.3d at
134) (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
108. In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 134; Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
109. For example, in Kronenberg, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 994, the plaintiff filed a
stipulation stating, among other things, that he was "not claiming emotional
distress damages because he did not suffer any emotional distress from or as a
result of [defendant's] actions" and he represented "that he waives now and
forever any claims for emotional distress damages however described and whether
of the garden variety or any other." See also In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 134 (agreeing
with Koch, 489 F.3d at 391, in that, among other things, "a plaintiff may withdraw
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with when the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be waived." °
Certain courts take a broad approach and conclude that a waiver
occurs any time a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages."'
Some courts take a narrow approach that waiver only exists when a
plaintiff chooses to affirmatively rely on the substance of the
privileged communications, such as by introducing a portion of the
privileged material or putting the treating provider on the stand."'
Still other courts take a middle-ground approach, finding that a
plaintiff does not waive the privilege if she merely asserts "garden-
variety" emotional distress. To complicate matters even further,
courts taking the middle-ground approach have different views on
what constitutes "garden-variety" emotional distress. I 4 Some courts
apply the same or similar factors in assessing whether a plaintiffs
claims for emotional distress are "garden-variety" to both waiver of
privilege and in the Rule 35 context.,.
Likewise, virtually every state recognizes some sort of implied
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but they vary on
their approach to it.' 3 The vast majority of states have some variant
of a patient-litigant exception, which is often statutory."'
110. See Anderson, supra note 91, at 118; Robert H. Aronson, The Mental Health
Provider Privilege in the Wake ofJaffee v. Redmond, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 591, 598-99
(2001); Ryan M. Gott, Note, The Evolving Treatment of "Garden-Variety" Claims Under
the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 6 SuFFoLKJ. TRIAL & App. ADvoc. 91, 101 (2001);
Ellen E. McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow Waiver of
the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege AfterJaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369,
1369 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Penn.
1997). See generally JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, 6-26 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 26.50[5] (3d ed. 2014).
112. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
See generally MOORE, supranote 111, § 26.50[5].
113. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 556 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (citing RUhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 449
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)).
114. SeeFlowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 220, 225-26 (N.D. 111. 2011) (noting
that "as so often occurs in these cases, it became apparent that the parties had very
different notions of what could grow in the garden" and discussing various
iterations of "garden-variety" emotional damages).
115. See Porter v. Pinkerton Gov't Servs., Inc., No. 13-1141 (GK), 2014 WL
2156974, at *6 (D.D.C. May 23, 2014) (applying five factors to waiver); St. John v.
Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); supra note 47 and
accompanying text (applying factors in Rule 35 context).
116. Anderson, supra note 91, at 148.
117. Id.
28
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Similarly, the scope and applicability of the physician-patient
privilege is subject to exceptions, which are often enumerated by
statute.
VI. PRIVACY CONCERNS
The notion of privacy is separate and distinct from the issue of
privilege. Although it is well established that federal courts
recognize that plaintiffs have an interest in the privacy of their
medical records, it is not an absolute right, nor is it dispositive in all
cases where a defendant seeks medical records.' 9
Federal courts have held that "the privacy of any individual
and the confidentiality of the files may be protected by an
appropriate protective order."'2 Thus, in response to plaintiffs'
objections on privacy grounds, courts often note that protective
orders ameliorate plaintiffs' privacy concerns.' Medical records
are often subject to disclosure only to opposing counsel and
experts unless there is a compelling reason for the opposing party
to view them."' In other words, they may be designated as
"Attorneys' Eyes Only" under the terms of the protective order
governing the case. Likewise, courts may direct parties to file
medical records under seal.'25
118. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 378 (2014).
119. EEOC v. Sheffield Fin. LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at *6
(M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena John Doe No. A01-
209, 197 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (E.D. Va. 2002)).
120. Id. (quoting Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., No. CIV-3-89-0189, 1991 WL
350038, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 1991)).
121. Id. (finding that the individual's privacy would be adequately protected
because a consent protective order had been entered for all documents and things
produced in discovery, thus rejecting EEOC's contention that former employee's
privacy would be invaded).
122. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-688, 2006 WL 2422596, at
*2-3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2006) (ordering medical records to be produced for
counsel's and experts' eyes only where there was no protective order in place but
noting that defendant would be permitted to seek a lower level of protection if it
believed it was warranted); see, e.g., Wetzel v. Brown, No. 1:09-cv-053, 2014 WL
684693, at *5 (D.N.D. Feb. 21, 2014) (concluding that because plaintiffs have
legitimate concerns over the confidentiality of their medical and psychological
records, attorneys' eyes only provisions in protective order were warranted).
123. See, e.g., Wetzel, 2014 WL 684693, at *5 (requiring defense counsel to file
any medical records with the court under seal); EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric
Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 400 (E.D. Cal. 2009) ("A protective order, and a
direction that any of the disclosed material filed with the court must be done
1020 [Vol. 41:3
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In cases where medical records are deemed to be discoverable,
there are often disputes about how those records should be
obtained by the defendant, especially considering their often
highly sensitive and private nature. Some courts permit plaintiff's
counsel the opportunity to obtain the records first and then
produce them to the defendant."' This allows plaintiffs counsel
the opportunity to withhold or redact documents on the basis of
lack of relevance, privilege, privacy concerns, or as counsel deems
to be appropriate. Where a plaintiff refuses to voluntarily
produce medical records, or a defendant is not satisfied with the
plaintiffs production of medical records, the defendant may take
more aggressive steps to get the records it desires.12 Sometimes a
defendant insists that a plaintiff must sign authorizations
consenting to release of her medical records directly to defendant
through defense counsel. If a plaintiff refuses to sign the
under seal, will protect [plaintiffs] privacy rights.").
124. See, e.g., Washam v. Evans, No. 2:IOCV00150JHL, 2011 WL 2559850, at *3
(E.D. Ark. June 29, 2011) (granting defendant's motion to compel medical
records and giving plaintiffs the option to either sign unconditional authorizations
for the records or obtain the records themselves and produce them to the
defendants).
125. Kersten v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., CIV. No. 11-1036
(DSD/JSM), 2011 WL 5373777, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2011) (permitting
plaintiff's counsel to examine and produce to defendant the relevant medical
records); J.J.C. v. Fridell, 165 F.R.D. 513, 517 (D. Minn. 1995) (permitting
plaintiffs counsel, in sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge case, to obtain
the medical and psychological records first to make a determination as to their
confidential nature before producing them, but warning that the court may
impose sanctions if it determines that records have been improperly withheld).
126. As one court noted:
There is no absolute rule prohibiting a party from seeking to obtain
the same documents from a non-party as can be obtained from a party,
nor is there an absolute rule providing that the party must first seek
those documents from an opposing party before seeking them from a
non-party. In many cases, it is important to obtain what should be the
same documents from two different sources because tell-tale
differences may appear between them; and in many cases when a party
obtains what should be the same set of documents from two different
sources a critical fact in the litigation turns out to be that one set
omitted a document that was in the other set.
EEOC v. Premier Well Servs., LLC, No. 4:10cv1419 SWW, 2011 WL 2198285, at *1
(E.D. Ark. June 3, 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Cofeyville Res. Ref. & Mktg.,
LLC v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 4:08MC00017JLH, 2008 WL 4853620, at *2
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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authorizations, a defendant may bring a motion to compel her to
127
do so. Most courts agree that Rule 34, along with Rule 37,
empower a court to order a plaintiff to execute written
authorizations consenting to the production of her medicalS128
records. Often in the court's view, signing an authorization
"represents the least expensive and most efficient means of
procuring information from medical or counseling providers.'
2
However, there are certain courts that have concluded that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not give courts the authority to
compel a plaintiff to execute a medical authorization."" These
courts reason that the medical care providers, not the patient,
maintain "possession, custody, and control" of the medical
records.' Further, there is an argument that defendants can just as
easily obtain copies of medical records from the medical provider's
custodian of records as from the plaintiff. 32 Thus, these courts
127. See FED. R. CIv. P. 34, 37.
128. See, e.g., Washam, 2011 WL 2559850, at *2 ("Requests for authorizations
for the release of ... records can be properly ordered pursuant to Rule 34 .... "
(citing Fridell, 165 F.R.D. at 517)); Arnold v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 05-0607-
CV-W-GAF, 2009 WL 1086949, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2009) (denying
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of order compelling them to provide
authorizations on the basis of Rule 37 (a) (5) (A)); Lischka v. Tidewater Servs., Inc.,
Civ. A. No. 96-296, 1997 WL 27066, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 1997) ("The cases
almost universally hold, explicitly or implicitly, that Rule 34, along with Rule 37,
empowers federal courts to compel parties to sign written authorizations
consenting to the production of various documents .... ").
129. EEOC v. Sheffield Fin. LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at *6
(M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) ("[G]ranting defendant's motion to compel execution
of medical release in Title VII case where plaintiff sought compensatory damages
for emotional distress." (quoting Smith v. Logansport Cmty. Sch. Corp., 139 F.R.D.
637, 649 (N.D. Ind. 1991))). Although "[i]t is common practice for a party who
obtains records with the authorization of the opposing party to provide copies of
those records to opposing counsel within a reasonable period of time," there is
"nothing in the Federal Rules that requires the defendants to provide these records
absent a discovery request." Washam, 2011 WL 2559850, at *3 (citations omitted).
130. See Fields v. W. Va. State Police, 264 F.R.D. 260, 263 (S.D. W.Va. 2010)
(finding no basis in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that empowers a court to
require a party to execute a release of medical records); Klugel v. Clough, 252
F.R.D. 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008) ("[A] request for production of documents pursuant
to Rule 34 ... cannot be utilized as a vehicle by which to compel a party to sign an
authorization for the release of medical records." (citing Becker v. Securitas Sec.
Servs. USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-2226-KHV-DJW, 2007 WL 677711, at *3 (D.
Kan. Mar. 2, 2007))).
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sometimes insist or imply that defendant should secure copies of
the medical records pursuant to a Rule 45 subpoena duces tecum to
the custodian of records of the medical provider.
13
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), which covers disclosures of medical records for judicial
proceedings, 3 4 provides a means for defendants to obtain medical
records without the plaintiff's signed authorization. 1-5 Specifically,
HIPAA permits a health care provider to release documents
containing protected health information in discovery in responseS 136
to a court order, or even in response to a subpoena or discovery
request, if the patient has been given notice in accordance with the
regulation 137 or the discovering party has made reasonable efforts
to obtain "a qualified protective order."'' 13 A qualified protective
order is a court order or a stipulation by the parties to the litigation
that allows protected health information to be used only for
purposes of litigation and mandates its return or destruction at the
conclusion of the litigation. 39
133. Fields, 264 F.R.D. at 263-64 ("If a party refuses to sign releases and makes
sworn statements that the party lacks all records of health treatment, then an
opposing party has little option but to use Rule 45 and the HIPAA regulations to
obtain the records."); Klugel, 252 F.R.D. at 55 n.2 (denying defendants' motion to
compel plaintiff to produce signed medical records and suggesting alternative
means for defendants to obtain discovery of medical records, including a
subpoena).
134. 45 C.F.R. § 16 4.512(e) (2014). HIPAA governs the use and disclosure of
protected health information. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164. It creates a monetary remedy
for the wrongful disclosure of medical information. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
However, there is no private cause of action under HIPAA. Runkle v. Gonzales,
391 F. Supp. 2d 210, 237 (D.D.C. 2005).
135. Lopez v. Cardenas Mkts., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00323-ECR-CWH, 2011 WL
4738111, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 5, 2011).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i).
137. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (A). This includes proof that the patient has been
given time to object to the court and "(1) [n]o objections were filed; or (2) [a]ll
objections filed ... have been resolved by the court ... and the disclosures being
sought are consistent with subject resolution." Id. § 16 4.512(e) (1) (iii) (C) (1)-(2).
138. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (B); see also Carpenter v. Res-Care Health Servs.,
Inc., 3:12-CV-08047, 2013 WL 1750464, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 23, 2013) (noting
that defendant can attach the protective order, as well as the court's current order,
to obtain the records directly from plaintiffs medical providers).
139. 45C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(v).
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VII. RECOMMENDED APPROACH
There is no cookie-cutter approach as to how parties and
courts should handle the discoverability of medical records in
employment law cases where the plaintiff has alleged emotional
distress damages. The appropriate approach will depend on the
type of motion, the jurisdiction, and the unique facts of each case.
That said, the following general approach may be used as a
guidepost for parties faced with such disputes and for courts
tackling these issues.
A. Parties
In employment law cases involving emotional distress, from
the Rule 26(f) conference forward, the parties should meet early
and regularly to discuss issues regarding the scope of discoverable
medical records, if any, and the manner of their production. The
parties should cooperate in getting a stipulation for a protective
order with an "Attorneys' Eyes Only" provision filed promptly so
that the court may issue a protective order. In undertaking efforts
to obtain medical records, the parties must be mindful of their
obligations under HIPAA, the federal rules, the local rules, and any
medical-provider-specific requirements.
Defendants should draft narrowly-tailored discovery requesting
information about plaintiffs' emotional distress damages. The time
frame and the substance of the records sought should be justifiable
based on the facts of the case. In other words, it is not appropriate
to ask the plaintiff to sign unlimited authorizations, to subpoena a
lifetime of plaintiff's medical records, or even to seek medical
records and medical provider information for an arbitrary number
of years.
In turn, plaintiffs should be accurate and detailed in their
objections and responses. The responses should provide basic
information about whether the plaintiff is seeking emotional
distress damages, whether the emotional distress is allegedly
ongoing (or the date certain by which it ceased), and how the
emotional distress manifested itself.4 0 A generic response that the
140. In John Doe I v. Mulcahy, Inc., Civil No. 08-306 (DWF/SRN), 2008 WL
4572515, at *6 n.4 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2008), the court could not evaluate
defendant's need for discovery or plaintiffs' right to privacy because no discovery
had taken place and the plaintiffs had not offered any stipulations. The court
indicated, "Plaintiffs could offer stipulations representing what is contained in the
1024 [Vol. 41:3
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plaintiff is seeking "garden-variety" emotional distress may not
provide sufficient information for the defense or the court.' All
objections should be clear. For example, it is helpfil for a plaintiff
to indicate whether any of the objections (e.g., on relevancy
grounds) pertain specifically to a certain time frame. Additionally,
plaintiffs should specify whether they are objecting on the basis of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the physician-patient
privilege, or both.
Defendants should provide plaintiffs the opportunity to
produce the medical records voluntarily in lieu of demanding that
plaintiff execute authorizations for the release of records to
defense counsel or subpoenaing the medical providers. In turn, a
plaintiff should promptly obtain and produce his relevant, non-
privileged medical records (absent any other valid objections).
Plaintiffs counsel should mark medical records "Attorneys' Eyes
Only" where appropriate.
If a plaintiff withholds documents on the basis of privilege, an
accompanying privilege log should be provided. 42  Rule
26(b) (5) (A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
[w]hen a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged
• . . the party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii)
describe the nature of the documents, communications,
or tangible things not produced or disclosed . . . in a
manner that, without revealing information itself
privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess
the claim.
4 3
In cases involving privileged medical records, courts have
permitted plaintiffs to provide a categorical privilege log instead of
a document-by-document privilege log. 4 A plaintiff should specify
the following information with respect to each professional whose
communications with the plaintiff are allegedly privileged: "(1)
medical records, whether there are any pre-existing conditions, whether any
physical manifestations are claimed beyond life's normal stressors, or whether the
Plaintiffs have sought counseling prior to, during, or after the alleged incidents."
Id.
141. Id. at *4.
142. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (5) (A).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., St. John v. Napolitano, 274 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding
that categorical privilege log satisfies Rule 26(b)(5)).
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[t]he name, address, and relevant qualifications of the mental
health professional; (2) [t]he approximate time period of the
privileged communications; [and] (3) [t]he general nature of the
communications . . . . ,5 Moreover, a party should certainly not
raise an objection to discovery requests on the basis of privilege
where the plaintiff did not actually communicate with a provider to
whom that privilege is applicable. 4'
While there may be circumstances where a defendant may
legitimately question the adequacy of the plaintiffs production of
medical records, defendants should refrain from issuing subpoenas
or bringing motions where plaintiff has, in good faith, represented
that she has already provided all of her non-privileged, relevant
medical records or that no such records exist. 14
The parties should meet and confer over any disputes relating
to medical records to try to resolve them without the court's
involvement. If the parties cannot work together on the production
of medical records, this will inevitably lead to additional costs and
delays for subpoenas and/or motions. When motions are necessary,
it is beneficial to separate and provide the appropriate analytical
framework for the issues of relevancy (including scope), privilege-
waiver, and independent medical examinations (IMEs), to the
extent they are in dispute. Likewise, it is crucial for the parties to
differentiate between the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the
physician-patient privilege. Ideally, disputes about medical
145. Id.
146. Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 475 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(expressing frustration that the plaintiff asserted psychotherapist-patient privilege
for documents that did not exist and requesting a ruling on the matter).
147. See, e.g., Sherif v. AstraZeneca, L.P., No. CIV. A. 00-3285, 2001 WL
527807, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. May 16) (granting plaintiffs motion for a protective
order concerning any other medical records where it appeared that all relevant
medical and psychiatric records had already been turned over by plaintiff), order
clarified, No. CIV. A. 00-CV-3285, 2001 WL 695038 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2001);
Broderick v. Shad, 117 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D.D.C. 1987) ("Since Broderick has
offered a sworn statement that she has not sought or received medical treatment
for the conditions alleged in . . . her complaint and that no relevant medical
records exist, we deny as irrelevant and intrusive defendant's motion to compel a
wholesale investigation of plaintiff's medical history over the past [eleven] years.").
148. Hannah v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 3:12CV1361, 2014 WL 2515221,
at *4 (D. Conn. June 4, 2014) (scolding both parties' counsel where they failed to
distinguish between the doctor-patient privilege and the psychoanalyst-patient
privilege for "miss[ing] the mark with respect to their arguments"); Michelman v.
Ricoh Ams. Corp., No. 11-CV-3633, 2013 WL 664893, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,
1026 [Vol. 41:3
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records should be resolved prior to taking the plaintiff's deposition
so as to avoid potential future disputes about whether the
deposition should be re-opened for further questioning on
additional medical records.
B. Courts
As an initial matter, the court should determine whether
emotional distress damages are actually sought by the plaintiff. If
they are, the court must make a determination whether to analyze
the production of medical records under Rule 26 and/or Rule 35.
St. John v. Napolitano articulates and demonstrates a well-reasoned
approach to using both Rules.14 9 In that case, the court began its
analysis with the "threshold question of relevance" under Rule
26. 15 It next addressed whether the plaintiff had waived the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 15 1 It noted that "the condition
precedent to a Rule 35 order-that the party's mental condition be
'in controversy'-raises essentially the same question as whether a
party has sufficiently put his or her mental condition at issue to
justify a finding that privilege has been waived., 152 Including a
preliminary Rule 26 analysis is well-founded because it puts the
onus on the defendant to "make a strong and clear showing of...
relevance" as opposed to permitting them to "rummage through all
aspects of the plaintiffs life in search of a possible source of stress
or distress. 1 53 It also avoids the tendency to conflate the issue of
relevancy with the issue of waiver of privilege.
Even though relevancy under Rule 26 is construed broadly,
this does not mean that medical records will be relevant in every
employment law case where a person seeks emotional distress
damages. 54 On the other hand, when the discovery sought appears
2013) (noting that plaintiff mistakenly relied heavily on the law governing
psychotherapist-patient privilege where the communications at issue were with her
cardiologist and that "[n]o physician-patient privilege exists under federal
common law" (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)).
149. 274 F.R.D. at 16-19.
150. Id. at 15-17, 20 n.6.
151. Id. at 17-21.
152. Id. at 20 n.6.
153. Evanko v. Elec. Sys. Assocs., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 2851, 1993 WL 14458, at *2
(S.D.N.Y.Jan. 8,1993).
154. See, e.g., Womack v. Wells Fargo Bank, 275 F.R.D. 571, 573 (D. Minn.
2011) (finding the relevance of plaintiffs medical records to the stated claim to be
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relevant, the court should consider arguments by the plaintiff, if
any, that the requested discovery is of such marginal relevance that
the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the
ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure, and/or that
"good cause" exists to demonstrate that the discovery would result
in unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.' 55 The Federal Rules of Evidence may be
helpful in guiding the court's analysis, or, at the very least, should
be kept in mind for potential later motions to exclude such
evidence at trial. 
5 6
In determining the scope of medical records, the court should
examine the appropriate time frame for discovery of such records.
Simply because "latent medical conditions can manifest themselves
in different ways over a period of time . . . this is a weak basis for
seeking records over ... a broad time period," especially where the
records pre-date the events alleged to give rise to the unlawful
conduct alleged in the complaint. Usually, the relevant time
period should not be dependent on the onset of the person's
mental health issue, which for some individuals may be in their
childhood or adolescence. Likewise, the relevant period for
medical records does not necessarily correspond with the start of a
plaintiffs employment with the defendant. For example, if two
plaintiffs were both sexually harassed by the same boss starting on
January 1, 2014, it does not follow that the time frame for their
medical records should be dependent on their tenure with the
company. Instead, the start date of the time period for medical
records should be justified in relation to the time frame of the
unlawful conduct alleged and, in certain cases, may pre-date it. 5s
Although the time frame will vary based on the facts of the case,
courts typically permit between one to five years pre-dating the
unlawful conduct. 59 If the plaintiff is seeking damages related to
de minimis).
155. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
157. St.John, 274 F.R.D. at 16-17 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
158. See, e.g., Kirchner v. Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 124 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)
(requiring plaintiff to produce mental health records from the year plaintiff began
working at the office where the alleged harassment occurred, instead of the year
when plaintiff's employment with the company began, and leaving the door open
to future motions to establish need for further records).
159. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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ongoing emotional distress, the time frame would likely be to the
present. However, if the plaintiff avers that her emotional distress
caused by the defendant's conduct ceased at a certain point in
time, then that should typically be the cut-off date for the
discoverability of medical records.
After the court has set the relevant time frame, it should then
focus on which specific providers have medical records likely to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It is important for
courts ruling on motions involving medical records to distinguish
between mental health and psychological records, as opposed to
"pure" medical records. 6 2 Records from mental health providers
often go right to the heart of a plaintiffs claim of emotional
distress. Thus, defendants have persuasive arguments as to why a
plaintiff's mental health records are relevant. Moreover, health
care providers who do not practice in a psychiatric specialty still
often include notes in their medical records about "consultation,
diagnosis and treatment of psychological" disorders. 6 ' On the
other hand, a defendant may not have any valid bases to assert that
all or any of a plaintiff's "pure" medical records are relevant.
Certain types of medical records (e.g., optometry, dentistry,
dermatology, or radiology) may have no bearing whatsoever on a
plaintiff's claim of emotional distress.tA In certain cases, records
relating to physical manifestations of emotional distress may be
160. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
162. John Doe I v. Mulcahy, Inc., No. 08-306 (DWF/SRN), 2008 WL 4572515,
at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2008) ("A defendant must initially establish a need for
medical records through narrowly-tailored interrogatories, requests for
admissions, or deposition testimony that seek information related to psychological
or mental-health records, as opposed to 'pure' medical records or broad
boilerplate requests." (citing Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 634 (N.D. Cal.
2003))); see, e.g., Manessis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 02 Civ. 359SASDF, 2002
WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002) (permitting discovery of plaintiffs
mental health treatment records, but concluding that general medical records are
not discoverable unless physical harm was a cause of emotional distress).
163. Carpenter v. Res-Care Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-08047, 2013 WL
1750464, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 23, 2013) ("[F]amily practitioners and internists
routinely address the signs and symptoms of depression and anxiety that arise in
their patient populations.")
164. Evanko v. Elec. Sys. Assocs., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2851 (LMM), 1993 WL
14458, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993) (noting that defendant's "argument, not
surprisingly, is devoid of any specific justification for their demand, for example,
for records of plaintiffs dermatologist and radiologist").
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relevant, and should be identified with as much specificity as
possible (e.g., records relating to headaches, ulcers, or hair loss) as
being within the scope of the permissible discovery.165 Likewise, in
some cases, records relating to other physical maladies during the
relevant time period that caused significant emotional distress
(e.g., a major car accident) may also be deemed relevant.'
Relatedly, the court should also drill down further to analyze
whether certain categories of medical records (e.g., "[1]aboratory
reports, x-rays, pathology reports, physical therapy records, and
information concerning physical examinations," etc.) from each of
the providers may be excluded as irrelevant."' Similarly, a court
should consider whether any medical records relating to certain
medical issues, especially highly personal or sensitive matters,
should be deemed to fall outside the scope of discovery r"'
To the extent that a court finds that medical records are
relevant and provides the parameters of their scope, the next issue
will be whether the plaintiff may withhold records on the basis of
any privilege assertions. As previously noted, the names of
providers and dates of treatment are not privileged.16 With respect
to the actual medical records, the court should decide whether the
physician-patient privilege (if available in that case under the law)
or the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been established by
plaintiff for communications with each medical provider. Finally,
the court should analyze whether there has been a waiver of
privilege and the scope of such waiver. This may depend on
whether the court follows the narrow, broad, or middle-ground
165. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
167. Walker v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. Civ.00-2604 MJD/JGL, 2002 WL
32539635, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2002); see also supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
168. See, e.g., Bruno v. CSX Transp., Inc., 262 F.R.D. 131, 133 n.2 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) (ordering production of unabridged medical records, but ordering HIV-
related records to be redacted, given that they were not relevant); Doe v. City of
Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("This court agrees that the
scope of discovery into this sensitive area should be limited and confined to that
information that is essential to a fair trial. Absent some extraordinary showing, for
example, defendants have no need to access records relating to the birth of Doe's
child. The magistrate correctly concluded that the interrogatories and subpoenas
as originally framed by the defendants were over broad. Doe's claim for emotional
distress damages does not entitle defendants to invade the whole of Doe's medical
history.").
169. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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approach to waiver. 7 ° Rule 35 may appropriately come into play in
the court's assessment of waiver, particularly if the court takes the
middle-ground approach."'
If the court determines that the defendant is entitled to
certain medical records, the court should give the plaintiff the
opportunity to obtain and provide those medical records to the172
defendant in a timely manner. This allows the plaintiff's counsel
the opportunity to withhold and/or redact documents in a manner
that is consistent with the court's order. If there are concerns about
the plaintiff's production, one option is for the plaintiff's counsel
to provide the records to the court for an in camera review of any
disputed documents. 73 Courts are within their discretion to issue
sanctions for noncompliance with court orders, including limiting
or barring plaintiffs claim for emotional distress damages.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, when faced with issues relating to medical records in
employment law cases involving emotional distress damages, parties
should try to avoid taking unjustified extreme positions, confusing
and conflating legal issues, or bringing premature motions. In
addition, when courts are faced with a motion involving the
discoverability of medical records in these cases, it is incumbent
upon them to use the proper analytical framework. A defendant
should not be entitled to go on a fishing expedition through a
lifetime of medical records when a plaintiff alleges emotional
distress in an employment law case.
170. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. As noted, there has been
significant debate and legal scholarship on the best approach to waiver. See supra
note 110. Proposing a solution to that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
171. See supra notes 115, 152 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
173. See Acquarola v. Boeing Co., No. Civ.A. 03-CV-2486, 2004 WL 540487, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2004) (concluding that the "[c]ourt will conduct an in
camera review of [plaintiffs] records" for relevancy and may determine that
certain records should be protected from disclosure tinder FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
174. See Sunegova v. Vill. of Rye Brook, No. 09-CV-4956 (KMK), 2011 WL
6640424, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2011) (barring plaintiff from seeking damages
for any emotional injury "beyond garden variety emotional distress" where
plaintiff, who alleged severe emotional distress, failed to comply with magistrate's
prior order to make her medical records available and insisted that she would not
sign the authorizations for release of her records).
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